fallen to 0.22% per year.
The magnitude, scale and transforming power of the Industrial Revolution lay in its unification of technological advance with the military power that generated easy British access to the markets of Europe, the Americas, the Near East and the Far East. As Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke (2007) emphasize, trade in a mercantilist world was not just the product of comparative advantage, but of comparative advantage married to the musket and the cannon. Britain's trading partners gained, however, along with Britain from the forced opening up of trade. A substantial share of the British TFP gain over these years was exported as cheaper manufactures to the rest of the world (Gregory Clark 2007a).
I. The Model
We ask what Industrial Revolution Britain would have looked like had trading opportunities with North America (and the Caribbean), or the rest of the world, been removed. We could use a simple Britain-only model and impose counterfactual trade levels, but as Nancy L. Stokey (2001) notes this approach is limited; absent detailed disaggregation it says nothing about cotton textiles and absent other regions and the terms-of-trade it says nothing about income and welfare. Our preferred tool is a three-region world economy model, for two benchmark periods, 1760-9 and 1850-9, the start and end of the Industrial Revolution. The model thus extends the two-region Industrial Revolution models developed by Crafts and Knick Harley (Harley and Crafts, 2000) .
The computable general equilibrium model is fully described by two sets of information.
The first is an accounting matrix for each region listing for each sector the value of goods produced, imported, and exported-and hence the domestic demand for those goods-and also the cost structure (inputs of primary factors and intermediate goods). The sectors are cotton textiles; other textiles; iron and steel; coal; agriculture; tropical raw materials; tropical food; and the rest of the economy. The factors are land, labor, and capital. All factors are region-specific but mobile across sectors (although land is used only in agriculture, tropical raw materials, and tropical food). The intermediate inputs accounted for by this model are:
coal into iron and steel; agricultural products into other textiles and coal; and tropical raw materials into cotton textiles and other textiles (and, for the 1850s, into agriculture and the rest of the economy as well).
The three regions are England (1760s) and later Britain (1850s); North America (including the Caribbean); and the Rest of the World (including Ireland). Trade is assumed costless. Goods produced in each region are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other, which allows two-way trade in the model. Imports and exports for each commodity are thus broken down by source and destination. Tropical raw materials and foods are produced in North America and the Rest of the World, but not in Britain. The regional production and trade matrices fully describe the static benchmark equilibrium, and are given in the appendix.
The second thing we need is a set of elasticities that describe the response of the economy to perturbations. Sectoral production is modelled as a Leontief combination of intermediate inputs and a value added aggregate. Value added is in turn a CES aggregate of the primary inputs. The elasticities of substitution in each sector are similar to those used by Harley and Crafts (2000) : elasticities are 1 (Cobb-Douglas) in cotton textiles, other textiles, iron and steel, coal, and the rest of the economy; elasticities are 0.5 in agriculture, tropical raw materials, and tropical food. Consumption is modelled by assuming a representative agent in each region, endowed with all primary factors of production in that region, and spending all her income on a composite utility good (the production of which thus serves as a welfare indicator). The utility good is produced by a CES utility function, with all eight commodities as inputs, and an elasticity of substitution of 0.5. These 24 Armington aggregates, one for each sector and region, are again CES combinations of the three varieties of the relevant commodity. Values of the Armington elasticities of substitution used for each commodity are close to those used by Harley and Crafts: we used values of 5 for cotton textiles, iron and steel, and coal; 2 for 'other textiles' and the rest of the economy; and 100 for agriculture. The Armington elasticities for tropical raw materials and food are particularly important for the counterfactual experiments we conducted, and we consider these separately below.
II. Calibration and Counterfactuals
To set up the model we sourced data as follows. The total value of English/British expenditure and its composition across different goods was taken from Clark (2007b) .
Imports and exports of each type of good were then taken from Ralph Davis (1962 Davis ( , 1979 .
Thus, the value of the production of each good could then be inferred. We imposed zero production of both tropical goods in Britain. Next, based on our rough estimates of factor shares and intermediate costs shares we were able to compute the input-output structure and the value of payments to factors in each sector, and thus in the aggregate. Via the circular flow, these factor payments equal total expenditure. For simplicity, we adjusted the rest of the economy sector's output and exports to impose balanced trade, although our results do not depend on this assumption. A different procedure was followed for the other two regions. For North America we assumed that final expenditure in each period on each good was a simple multiple of British expenditure, scaling by population relative to England/Britain, and thus assuming the same relative living standard (except that coal consumption was set equal to imports from Britain).
For the Rest of the World we assumed that incomes per person relative to England were the same in the 1760s, and at 40% of the British level by the 1850s. In the rest of the world we imposed an assumed pattern of final consumption in each period, with the following weights for each sector: cotton textiles, 0.02, other textiles, 0.04, iron and steel, 0.01, coal, 0.001, temperate agriculture, 0.375, tropical agriculture, 0.375, rest of the economy, 0.18. Thomas
Ellison's discussion of cotton consumption per person in India in the 1850s suggests this is probably an underestimate of cotton and cotton goods production in the rest of the world, even though it implies that the cotton industry in the rest of the world was nearly 5 times as large as in England (Ellison, 1858, p. 73) . Import and export data were then constructed using the Davis (1962 Davis ( , 1979 ) data for trade with England/Britain and some auxiliary data and assumptions.
1 Table 1 shows the resulting estimated trade patterns in the 1760s and 1850s.
From the consumption and trade patterns we infer production patterns and, assuming that input cost shares in each sector were like those in Britain, we infer payments to intermediates and to all factors. Once again, factor incomes are equal to expenditure by construction, and trade was forced to be balanced by adjusting the rest of the economy sector in each case.
With the model set up we impose various counterfactual shocks and see how the model world economy would react. Our interest is in evaluating the hypothesis that the British Industrial Revolution depended crucially on international trade-either with North America, The purpose of the three experiments is to gauge how vital a contribution trade with each region, and trade as a whole, made to the structural transformation and growth of the British economy. For example, the "No NA" shock permits us to grapple with the thesis of Pomeranz (2000) and see how critical New World supplies of raw cotton were to the rise of Lancashire.
The "No ROW" shock allows us to see the importance of other major export markets for Lancashire's cotton products, as well as the role played by alternative suppliers of raw cotton like Egypt and India. In the remainder of the paper we describe the results of these counterfactuals and how they pose a challenge to current interpretations of the Industrial Revolution.
III. Results
The results are given in Tables 2 and 3 , but the intuition behind the results comes from the trade data in Table 1 . The results depend largely on trade patterns in the 1760s and 1850s.
Several differences between the two periods stand out. First, and most obviously, in the 1760s England was still a large net importer of cotton textiles from the rest of the world, which also exported textiles to North America. By the 1850s, Britain was a large net exporter of cotton textiles to both the other regions, thanks to the new technologies of the Industrial Revolution. Second, in the 1760s England was paying for her imports of food and tropical products primarily with net exports of "other" goods, and of woollens and other textiles. By the 1850s, exports of non-cotton textiles had declined in relative importance: cotton textiles and exports of "other" goods were now relatively speaking far more dominant. A third point to note is that in the 1760s, imports of tropical raw materials came predominantly from the rest of the world, while imports of tropical food came predominantly from North America.
By the 1850s, imports of tropical raw materials from North America had considerably grown in relative importance, thanks to the boom in raw cotton exports, while the rest of the world was now more important than North America as a source of tropical food imports. World sugar and Asian pepper, say, might not have mattered for the fortunes of British industry, it should have had an impact on British consumer welfare, in a counterfactual world in which Britain was prevented from trading with either of the two regions. In our benchmark specification, these elasticities are both set to 5, since these are the 'upper end' Armington elasticities used by Harley and Crafts, but we also tried lowering the elasticities to 2, and increasing them to 100 (equivalent to making the different varieties of these goods almost perfect substitutes). Table 2 gives the results of isolating England from its trading partners in the 1760s. For each of our three counterfactual scenarios, the model generated outputs in each sector; prices in each sector; nominal factor prices; the price of the utility good, which is equivalent to a consumer price index; nominal household income; real factor prices and household income;
and utility (i.e. the output of the utility good). The most important point is that preventing trade between England and North America would have had barely any effect on England. In the benchmark case, utility declines by less than 2%, with a modest real wage decline of 4.3%, a decline in real profits of 5.7%, and a rise in real land rents of 9.4%. Cotton textiles output would have gone down only barely: by just 1.1%, as compared with a decline in the output of other textiles of almost a tenth, the latter due to the disappearance of North American markets.
Removing the rest of the world would have had a bigger effect, since it was a much bigger region. Strikingly, eliminating trade between England and the rest of the world in the 1760s would have increased English cotton textile output by a third, since England was still a net importer of Indian cotton textiles. Similarly, English agricultural output would have expanded (by 8.8%) to replace food imported from the rest of Europe. As a result all other sectors would have contracted, as resources were sucked away from them. Utility would have declined less than previously (1.7%), but with greater distributional shifts, since in the 1760s
English imports of temperate climate agricultural products still came predominantly from Europe rather than from North America (or other continents). Thus English landlords would have seen real incomes rise by over a quarter, while workers and capitalists would have seen real incomes declines of 7.9% and 10.6% respectively.
Not surprisingly, 'eliminating' both North America and the rest of the world has an even bigger impact on the traditional textile sector, cutting it by over a quarter. Cotton textiles production would have increased by a quarter, and agriculture by 14.5%. Real rents increase by 44.9%, at the expense of real wages (down 13.9%) and real profits (down a fifth), but the aggregate utility effect would still have been surprisingly small (a decline of less than 4%).
Finally, note that varying the Armington elasticities for tropical food and tropical raw materials would have barely changed the results. other textiles output by a tenth. Cotton textiles output would have declined both because of the disruption to raw cotton supplies, and because of the loss of markets. On balance, the former effect seems to be more important, since the real price of British cotton textiles increases in this simulation. Furthermore, when the elasticity of substitution between tropical raw materials from North America and the rest of the world is lowered to from its benchmark value of 5 to 2, implying that the rest of the world was less able to substitute for lost American raw cotton supplies, British cotton textiles output contracts by more (15%-18%).
On the other hand, if that elasticity is raised to 100, then the output only falls by 2%. Utility falls by between 1.6% and 3.6%, depending on the sizes of Armington elasticities chosen, with larger elasticities corresponding to lower welfare losses. While these are larger welfare effects than those calculated for the 1760s, they are still modest. The rest of the world could have filled in for a missing North America, providing markets, raw materials and tropical food products, and so minimising the overall loss to the British economy. Once again, landlords would have gained by roughly 10%, at the expense of workers and capitalists.
On the other hand, the welfare loss is much greater-over 10%-when trade with the rest of the world, rather than North America, is eliminated. Cotton textiles output contracts by over a third, as the foreign markets upon which Lancashire was increasingly dependent vanish. (Note the difference with the results for the 1760s: by the 1850s Britain was a net exporter of cotton textiles to India and the rest of the world, rather than a net importer.) Since the rest of the world mattered for the British cotton textiles industry more by providing markets than by providing raw cotton, it is not surprising that the two Armington elasticities highlighted earlier turned out to be essentially irrelevant for this counterfactual experiment.
Consistent with Stokey (2001) , the distributional effects of this shock are enormous, with real rents more than doubling, and real wages and profits declining by over a fifth. In terms of TFP performance, a decline of a third in the cotton textile sector would have lowered the economy-wide TFP growth rate by .06% per annum, or by 6% over the entire 1760s-1850s period (assuming unchanged sector-specific TFP growth rates).
Finally, "eliminating" all of Britain's trading partners would have had an even bigger effect on the economy, with utility falling by over 27% in the benchmark case (again, this result was invariant to changes in the two afore-mentioned Armington elasticities). This is an enormous effect in the context of a model with no increasing returns or other non-concavities, and is much larger than previous estimates in the literature (for example, according to Harley (2004, p. 194) , "Self-sufficiency in 1860...would have cost Britain only...about 6 per cent of national income"). Cotton textiles output would have declined by almost three-fifths, implying a reduction in the economy-wide TFP growth rate of 0.11%, more than a quarter of the Industrial Revolution productivity growth rate, while real wages and profits would have declined by over a third. If we had been able to go further, and completely eliminate Britain's trading partners, the effects on economy-wide welfare and textiles output would obviously have been even greater (and the crucial cotton textiles sector would of course have vanished altogether). And ours may yet be a conservative estimate of hypothetical TFP losses, for if the dynamic cotton textiles sector had grown more slowly, then the incentives to innovate (or even passive "learning by doing" opportunities) might have been scaled down too.
IV. Conclusion
While colonies were not required for an Industrial Revolution, supply-side TFP growth was not alone sufficient. In Smithian terms, in the 19th-century global "division of labor" it was the "power of exchanging" that "gave occasion" to the Industrial Revolution. The highly specialized British economy was extremely dependent on foreign trade by the 1850s.
It is worth emphasising why the 1850s results are so different from the 1760s. This has nothing to do with model specification. The model is identical in both cases, as are all the embedded elasticities. The different results arise from the data fed into the model, which in turn reflect the profound shifts in the structure of the British economy during the Industrial Revolution. First, unbalanced productivity growth meant that British autarkic relative prices diverged from those in the rest of the world, implying much larger gains from trade. The cotton textiles sector became dependent on foreign markets for about 60% of its total sales.
Second, British population growth meant that the island depended on foreign agriculture for both food and raw materials, implying that it needed to export a growing amount of manufactures to pay for these imports (Harley and Crafts 2000; Clark 2007a ).
As a famous Welsh economic historian put it, "How could this unprecedented swarming of people on a small, offshore island be made consistent with a rising standard of Source: See text. TRM=100; TFOOD=100  TRM=5; TFOOD=5  TRM=2; TFOOD=5  TRM=5; TFOOD=2  TRM=2; TFOOD=2 Notes: BM = Benchmark. No NAM = North American endowments set to 5% of actual. No ROW = rest of world endowments set to 5% of actual. Neither = North American and rest of world endowments set to 5% of actual. TRM = Armington elasticity of substitution between North American and rest of world tropical raw materials. TFOOD = Armington elasticity of substitution between North American and rest of world tropical food. TRM=100; TFOOD=100  TRM=5; TFOOD=5  TRM=2; TFOOD=5  TRM=5; TFOOD=2  TRM=2; 
Data Appendix
The social accounting matrices for the three regions at the two benchmark dates are shown at the end of this appendix, and they were constructed as follows.
Great Britain, 1850s
Cotton textiles: Cotton here includes cotton and linen and jute. The value of output is taken as £67.8 m. based on value of imports of cotton, flax, indigo and other dyestuffs of £31.6 m. (Davis 1979, 109, 124-5) and a markup estimate (Harley 1998, table 5, 64) . Labor and capital shares in value added are assumed 50:50 based on Harley (1998) , and Harley and Crafts (2000) , but modifying for the absence in our model of the non-traded sector. The implied value added in "cottons" is 6.3% of total value added. The employment share of this sector in England and Wales in 1851 was 5.9%, so this figure seems reasonable (Parliamentary Papers, 1852-3).
Other textiles: These are the wool and silk industries. The value of outputs of £60.4 m. and intermediate inputs (£15.8 for wool and £6.3 for silk) are from Deane and Cole (1967, 196-210) and Davis (1979) . Labor and capital shares are again taken as 50:50. The implied value added here is 6.6%. That makes the combined value added in all the textile industries 12.9%. The employment share of all textiles in 1851 in England and Wales was 11%, but this is assumed a more capital intensive sector than on average.
Iron and steel: This is here taken to include other metals and metal manufactures such as tin, copper, lead and zinc. Employment in these sectors was 5.5% of all employment in England and Wales in 1851. To account for these other metal sectors output was taken as £69.4, 1.5 times the output for iron alone given by Deane and Cole (1967, 225) figure for iron alone. Coal inputs of £11 m. calculated from coal required per ton given in Hyde (1977, 142, 153) . Labor and capital shares are 67:33 based on Harley and Crafts (2000) . This implies a value added share of 10.1%. The employment share of the metal industries in England and Wales was just 5.5%, but given the high assumed capital/labor ratio this is reasonable.
Coal: A physical net output of 65 m tons for Great Britain was estimated from Church (1986, 3, 19) . This corresponded to a value of £37.1 based on an average price at final consumption of £0.57. There was a domestic farm input of horses, oats, timber, etc., of £0.8 from Church (1986, 502, 521-2) . Labor, capital, and land shares of 0.61, 0.27, and 0.12 are based on Clark and Jacks (2007, Value added in the rest of the economy is calculated as a residual between this scaled up figure and the sums of output for the above industries. All tropical raw materials not used as inports in other sectors are assumed to be inputs here. In this sector, which includes large amounts of services, the inputs were assumed to be 70% labor and 30% capital.
Imports: Imports are partitioned into those from North America and the Caribbean, and those from the rest of World (including Ireland). For North America and the Caribbean, and the rest of World, the data are from Davis (1979) , pp. 109, 124-5 on imports minus re-exports into the UK, and are the average of the years 1854-6.
The Davis figures include Ireland. We thus need to allocate these imports between Britain and Ireland. Ireland's population was 21.6% of UK population, but since we assume Irish income per person was only 0.6 of that in the UK (comparing wages as in Clark (2005) , and Geary and Stark (2004) ), Irish income was only 14.2% of UK income. We assume the only imports to the UK going to Ireland were tropical foods (tea, coffee, sugar etc.), and allocate these proportionally to income. This gives Ireland £3.2 m. of such imports, compared to British consumption of £19.0 m.
Ireland is assumed to export just linen textiles and food to England. We assume linen imports to Britain from Ireland equal British cotton textiles exports from Britain to Ireland. We assume consumption of each good in Ireland is 16.55% of British consumption based on the estimated relative incomes above (and implicitly assuming that preferences are identical and homothetic in Ireland and Britain). That makes Irish cotton textile consumption £4.7 m., and hence linen exports £4.7 m. also.
Agricultural output in Ireland is assumed to be the same per acre as in Britain. Based on 1866 acreages this makes it £56.0, compared to £123.8 in Britain. Since final UK consumption is £218.5 this makes Irish agricultural exports to Britain £25 m. A balancing factor of £38.2 is added to rest of the economy exports to the rest of the world to assure overall trade balance in the UK as well as in Britain.
Rest of the World, 1850s
Production: In each sector, output is total final use minus imports plus intermediate uses. All intermediate input shares are as in Britain, except coal is replaced by wood produced in the agricultural sector. Labor and capital shares are assumed at 70:30 for cotton textiles, other textiles, iron and steel, coal and the rest of the economy, reflecting less mechanization (lower capital shares) than in Britain. The labor, capital and rent shares in agriculture, tropical raw materials and tropical food are set at 40%, 20%, and 40% as in British agriculture.
Production plus net imports is set to final consumption.
Imports: Imports from the UK are based on Davis's export data for the UK to the rest of the world for 1854-6, adding in British exports to Ireland. Exports from North America and the Caribbean to the rest of the world are assumed to have same composition as UK imports from this region. The level of exports from US to the rest of the world is estimated from Doug Irwin's U.S. Historical Statistics exports estimate of $144 million total exports from the US compared to $71 million going to the UK in 1850 (Irwin, 2006a) .
Exports: Exports to the UK are based on Davis's import data for the UK from the rest of the world. Exports from the rest of the world to North America and the Caribbean are assumed to have same composition. The level of exports from the rest of the world to North America and the Caribbean is computed from Irwin's U.S. Historical Statistics total US imports estimate of $174 million, with $75 million coming from the UK, in 1850 (Irwin, 2006b) . A balancing factor of £22.8 m. is added to rest of the economy exports from the rest of the world to North America to assure overall trade balance in both the rest of the world and North America and the Caribbean.
Consumption: We assume the rest of the world total consumption expenditure is £13,118.4 m., given by British consumption times 22.75. This ratio is based on an assumed rest of world:British population ratio of 1,240:21.8 and a consumption per person ratio of 40%. This assumes a total world population of 1,300 in the 1850s based on the estimates of Durand (1977) , Haub (1995) and McElready and Jones (1978) . We assume consumption weights in the rest of the world are: cotton textiles 2%, other textiles 4%, iron and steel 1%, coal 0.1 %, temperate agriculture 37.5%, tropical raw materials 0%, tropical food 37.5%, and the balance for rest of the economy. These shares are adjusted from those of Britain to reflect lower incomes and higher textile prices, based in part on Clark (2007) , 40-70. Thus in Britain cotton textiles were 4.9% and other textiles 8.8%.
Total final use: For each sector this is consumption plus exports minus imports.
North America and Caribbean, 1850
Production: In each sector, output is total final use minus imports plus intermediate uses.
Coal output and input use is set to zero (forcing imports to go to consumption). All intermediate input shares are as in Britain, except coal is replaced by wood from agriculture. Labor and capital shares are assumed at 50:50 for cotton textiles, and other textiles; at 33:67 for iron and steel, and 70:30 for the rest of the economy, reflecting assumed similar mechanization levels to Britain. Labor, capital and rent shares in agriculture, tropical raw materials and tropical food are set at 40%, 20% and 40% as in British agriculture.
Imports: Imports from the UK are based on Davis's export data for Britain to North America and the Caribbean. Imports from the rest of the world to this region are assumed to equal exports by the rest of the world to North America.
Exports: Exports to the UK are based on Davis import data for Britain from the rest of the world. Exports to the rest of the world are assumed to equal imports by the rest of the world from North America.
Consumption: We assume total consumption expenditure in North America and the Caribbean was £1101.6, given by British consumption times 1.91. This ratio is based on an assumed North America and the Caribbean: British population ratio of 41.7:21.8 (Mitchell, 2003) , and a North American and Caribbean consumption per person equal to that of Britain per person. We assume homothetic identical preferences in Britain and North America and the Caribbean.
Total final use: For each sector, consumption plus exports minus imports.
England, 1760.
Cotton textiles: Cotton again includes cotton and linen and jute. The value of output is taken as £1.4 m. based on value of imports of cotton, flax, indigo and other dyestuffs of £0.19 m. (Davis, 1962, 300) and markup estimate (Harley, 1998, Deane and Cole, 1967, 196, 210 . Raw and thrown silk inputs (£0.75) are from Davis (1962) , 300. Labor and capital shares are assumed 50:50 based on the 1850s shares.
Iron and steel: The output of £1.57 m. is from Deane and Cole (1967, 221) . The coal input of £0.19 m. is calculated from the input:output ratios given in Hyde and coal prices calculated from Clark and Jacks (2007, 67) . Labor and capital shares are 67:33 based on Harley and Crafts (2000) .
Coal: Output of £3.41 m. from Flinn (1984) estimate of output of 6 m. tons and final consumption price of £0.57. Agricultural input of horses, oats, timber, etc., of £0.04 m. from Church (1986, 502, 521-2) . Labor, capital, and land shares of 0.61, 0.27, and 0.12 are based on Clark and Jacks (2007, (Clark, 2007, 139, Mitchell and Deane, 1971, 5 
